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Introductory note 
In July 197?, an aide memoire was signed between the executive secretaries 
D-P the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and the Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) dealing with the possibilities for 
regional co-operation between the two commissions in the field of transnational 
1/ corporations (TNCs).— In the aide memoire, the executive secretaries agreed 
to launch an interregional project on transnational corporations in export-oriented 
2/ 
primary commodities.— Based on appropriate provisions made in the aide memoire, 
the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) joined the project in early 1978. 
'It was agreed that the regional commissions concerned, together with the 
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, co-operate in the conduct 
of in-depth case studies on the involvement of transnational corporations in 
export-oriented primary commodities in the developing countries. In order to 
provide a common focus, a general conceptual framework for the conduct of case 
studies was developed. 
2/ Aide memoire between the executive secretaries of ECLA and ESCAP on 
"Interregional co-operation among regional commissions in the field 
of transnational corporations", (Geneva, 26 July 1977) (mimeographed), 
2/ Ibid., paras. 6-9. 
3/ See CEPAL/CTC Joint Unit, "Transnational corporations in export-oriented 
primary commodities: a study of relative bargaining positions and 
distribution of gains", Working Paper N°6 (Santiago, Chile, 30 August 
1977) and a revised version published by the Joint CTC/ESCAP Unit in 
September 1978. 
Simultaneously with the development of the common conceptual framework, 
:-.ree case studies of Latir. American governments bargaining capacity vis-a-vis 
TNCs and resulting distribution of gains -have been undertaken in the Joint 
CEPAL/CTC Unit: bauxite industry in the Caribbean countries, tin industry in 
1/ 
Bolivia and banana industry in the Central American countries.— 
The objective of this paper is to summarize the case studies and draw 
preliminary conclusions for discussion in the Interregional Expert Group Meeting 
or Transnational Corporations in Primary Export Commodities (Bangkok, 8-15 
October 1979). 
Throughout the paper an attempt has been made to present the Latin American 
experience in terms of the above cited common research framework, underlining 
the outstanding aspects of similarity and diversity of cases under examination, 
the Latin American governments policy objectives in the internalization of 
commodity industries gains through processing and marketing, in the redistribution of 
the industry gains increasing government budget incomes through new fiscal 
policies and, finally, in increasing the sovereignity over developing 
countries natural resources through major national control of the industries, 
including nationalization of TNCs assets. The Latin American experience in 
the pursuance of these government policy objectives is being, at the same 
time, analysed within the context of the dynamic interplay of TNCs counter-strategies, 
trade-offs and new types and forms of co-operation with the developing producer 
countries governments and their public agencies and enterprises. Finally, an 
attempt is undertaken to evaluate the experience both positive and negative 
of horizontal co-operation among developing countries of the region including 
1_/ See, Transnational Corporations in the Bauxite Industry of Caribbean Countries, 
E/CEPAL/L.199, August 1979; Transnational Corporations in the Bauxite Industry 
of Caribbean Countries: Recent Development in Jamaica, E/CEPAL/L. 201, September 
1979; Transnational Corporations linkages with the tin industry in Bolivia, 
E/CEPAL/L. 202, September 1979; Transnational Corporations in the Banana Industry 
of Central America, E/CEPAL/L. 203, September 1979. 
some tentative proposals for the follow-up activities of this Interregional 
Project and Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit participation in it. 
This discussion paper was prepared by the Regional Adviser of the 
Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit Jan Knakal. The general research framework and its 
application in the analysis and conclusions, owes itself basically to 
Anibal Pinto, Director of CEPAL Economic Developement Division and 
Bpnny Widyono, former staff member of the Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit, in charge of 
the Interregional Project and, presently Chief of the Joint ESCAP/CTC Unit. 
A number of other CEPAL experts and consultants participated directly in the 
elaboration and discussion of the different case studies and should be 
1/ 
thanked for their work and valuable comments.— Finally, the government of 
Canada through CIDA provided the necessary finance and sponsored the Canadian 
experts participating in the initial stage of the studies on TNCs activities 
in Latin American primary commodities. Notwithstanding the above acknowledgments, 
the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of CEPAL or the individuals mentioned above. 
Responsibility for any errors and omissions is solely that of the author. 
1/ See the introductory notes of the Unit's papers cited above. 

A. THE CASE OF BAUXITE INDUSTRY IN CARIBBEAN 
1. TNCs in the prenegotia';iori (colonial) period of Caribbean countries 
By the early 1970s, six large TNCs controlled three quarters of the world's 
aluminium producing capacity: three American-based, the Aluminium Company of 
America (ALCOA), Reynolds Metals Company and Kaiser Aluminium and Chemical 
Corporation; one Canadian, Aluminium Company of Canada (ALCAN); one French-
based, Pechiney Compagnie de Produits Chimique et Electrometallurgiques (FUK), 
and a Swiss-based, Schweizerisches Aluminium A.G. (Alusuisse). All six 
are highly integrated producers, engaging in the bauxite mining, production 
of alumina, smelting of aluminium ingots and fabrication of aluminium 
products. 
It. very broad terms, three periods can be distinguished in the development 
of the industry in the Western Hemisphere market. From its conception to 
the forties, it was monopolized by U.S. ALCOA and its Canadian subsidiary 
ALCAN which were isolated from European imports through a series of cartel 
arrangements. In the second stage, between the outbreak of World War II 
and late 1950s increased greatly the demand for aluminium and the U.S. 
government anti-monopoly legislation led to increased competition among the 
established and newly entering firms, which led to a scramble for mining 
concessions in the Caribbean countries and, in some cases, to establishing 
of processing capacities there. Throughout the decade of 1950s the mining 
of bauxite in three Caribbean countries (Guyana, Jamaica and Suriname) 
increased more than three times and alumina plants were constructed. During 
the recent period of the 1960s and 1970s the Caribbean host countries 
involved more actively in the bauxite industry, particularly after gaining 
of independence with resulting development needs and programmes. TNCs 
reacted to rising costs of production and the risks evolving from new 
host governments policies with their own counter-strategies and greater 
co-operation among themselves. For example, Reynolds, Kaiser and Anaconda 
joined to form a new firm, ALPART, in Jamaica for the mining of bauxite; 
in Suriname, ALCOA and'ALCAN joined with Billiton and Ornet to build an; 
aluminium smelter and ALCOA joined there also with the French FUK in a joint 
venture. Such joint ventures reduced the sourcing competition and also spread 
the initial large investment cost and, perceived political risk among a 
number of TNCs. 
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The main objectives of the TNC s in the colonial period may be' 
synthetisized in a following way: 
(i) To secure rights of exploration and exploitation over as large 
an area and as long a time as possible and on exclusive, or monopoly terms 
in order T:O pre-empt effectively those resources, that is to block access 
to rival or potentially rival companies. 
(ii) To insulate such arrangements to the maximum degree possible 
from' the exercise of the existing local legislative power by the device of 
long-term contractual agreements and specifically providing for arbitration 
of disputes in the courts of the TNC home country or by international bodies 
outside the reach of the host country's jurisdiction. 
(iii) To minimize, the likelihood of disputes, under such contractual 
arrangements, by requiring the inclusion of provisions covering as many 
details as possible as to hiring policies, royalties, taxes or rather 
exemption from them, as well as from restrictions concerning foreign exchange 
transactions, etc. 
(iv) In eventual renegotiation of agreements to yield on matters 
not affecting their control, such as increased local participation in middle 
level management, royalties and taxes to be paid to the government and 
higher level of bauxite processing (when it implied a reduction of production 
and transportation costs). 
(v) In case of emerging- risk to loose effective control in favour 
of the host country to transfer the sourcing of bauxite to other locations 
and divest its assets in the respective host country. 
In the colonial period the TNCs had been able to extract considerable 
concessions from colonial administrations whose representatives defended . 
the worldwide interests of industrialized countries and their companies 
rather than the development .and diversification needs of the plantation-
economies of Caribbean region. For example, the ALCOA's 1958 Brokopondo 
Project in Suriname including refining and hydroelectric complex enabling 
to produce aluminium, gave ALCOA exclusive rights for a 10 year period over 
an area up to 500 000 hectares (legal limit was 20 000 hectares). Similarly, a 75 
year operating rights over a maximum of 20 000 hectares (legally limited 
to ^0 years and 2 000 hectares), years extension of existing mining 
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rights, concessions concerning taxes and costs of construction and exemption 
from import and export duties. The government had to bear all the costs 
of the infrastructural development, provide land for the construction of 
the smelter and hydroelectric plant ._1/ 
Similarly in Guyana the ALCAN's project to construct a small alumina plant 
through the subsidiary Demerara Bauxite Company (DEMBA), received an 
outright tax holiday lasting five years and further concessions to keep 
it from paying any taxes at all until 1971« An example of political 
pressure presented the situation in 1952, when a new constitution was 
adopted and the government tried to alter the relationship between ALCAN 
and the country. Faced with the threat of conflict, the British Crown 
abrogated the new constitution and installed a care-taker government more 
favorable to TNCs. 
The TNCs capacity to conceal before the public authorities the 
real financial results of their operations also frustrated the possibilities 
of securing major budget income from further processing of bauxite. After 
Jamaica gained independence, in 1962, several alumina refining plants had 
been established and between 1966 and 1972 exports of this commodity increased 
almost three times. But the increased tax payments from bauxite activities 
did not materialize because the companies were able to record almost no 
profit from the new alumina plants by using, as in the case of bauxite, 
transfer pricing allowing the local plants to minimize their tax costs 
through artificially low "prices" accounted for alumina. 
1/ For a detailed analysis of various agreements, see N. Girvan, "Making the Rules of the Game: Company-Country Agreements in the 
Bauxite Industry", Social and Economic Studies, December, 1971-
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2. The role of bauxite industry in the economies of Guyana and Jamaica 
In both, Jamaica and Guyana the mining sector has traditionally been the 
important activity in the countries GNP and employment particularly in Guyana. 
In the middle of 1970s-, the share of bauxite and alumina in total exports 
reached about 70°/o in Jamaica and one third in Guyana. The multiplier effects 
of bauxite mining were limited to the backward linkages with other inputs, 
like water, energy, and timber, construction activities (including corresponding 
infrastructure in roads, ports and other transportation facilities) and, finally, 
the overall impact on balance of payments, governmental budget, wage and 
salaries level, etc. _1/ 
The persistent high level of dependence of Caribbean host countries on 
bauxite and alumina production and export accompanied by the low share of host 
economies in the overall benefits born by the industry development in the colonial 
period were among the main factors which eventually led to the gaining of 
political indeoendence (in 1962 in Jamaica, 1966 in Guyana and 1975 in Suriname). 
The new nation-states used their bargaining power vis-a-vis the TNCs declaring 
the policy goals for the bauxite industry in a broader context of the development 
needs and strategies. 
The host country policies, which reached beyond immediate revenue and 
foreign exchange considerations, are particularly significant in Guyana and Jamaica, 
whose governments are committed to achieve a greater measure of social justice 
through the transformation of their economies, and whose foreign exchange 
situation is very difficult. Although Suriname has followed policies similar 
'Those in foreign-owned mining became usually a bench-mark for other 
economic sectors. 
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to those of Jamaica, the less developed economy and continuing close ties with 
the Netherlands (financial grants, soft loans and heavy out-migration resulting 
from Dutch social security policies) have insulated the country from major 
foreign exchange pressures and problems. 
Each of the Caribbean Governments adopted somewhat different strategies 
vis-a-vis TNCs reflecting mainly variations in socioeconomic structures, 
ideological posture and international 'affiliation. Nevertheless, the strategies 
have been complementary, rather than rivalistic and mutually exclusive and 
reinforced their common bargaining power. The debate, for example, as to whether 
Jamaica's levy is more or less advantageous than Guyana's nationalization is not 
particularly useful in determining whether either of these governments had, 
at the time and in the given political and economic circumstances, any option 
more valuable than the one they chose to adopt. Furthermore, experience and 
knowledge gained by each of these countries have become available to each of 
the others, and indeed to other bauxite producing countries, whether by explicit 
mutual exchange of information (jamaica) or by common informed observation of the 
results (IBA). 
The bargaining situation in Caribbean thus approximated more closely the 
economic and political realities of the relative power of the parties involved. 
Nonetheless the companies retained oligopolistic advantages in their international 
control uf the marketing of bauxite, alumina, and aluminium; in their near-monopoly 
on technology, including that required to develop alternate sources of aluminium 
from lower-grade bauxites and from non-bauxite materials; and in their access 
to large pools of consortia finance. 
- 6 -
3. Fiscal and ownership participation policies of Jamaica 
a) Bargaining capacity of Jamaica in the 1970s 
One of the factors giving significant bargaining leverage to the 
government was the fact that four major TNCs operating in Jamaica (ALCOA, 
ALCAN, Reynolds and Kaiser), depended heavily on her bauxite resources 
(11% 55% 57and 58°/o respectively). Due to lessening industry concentration, 
also Revere Copper and Brass and Anaconda Copper companies were operating in 
Jamaica by 1970. Owing to special characteristics of bauxite of different 
origin, the TNCs processing facilities using Jamaican inputs would have to be 
overhauled (which is a time and cost consuming processs), if diversifying to 
other resource origin. 
Secondly, the low share of bauxite and alumina in the final price of 
aluminium made it possible to obtain increased revenue wdth only a slight 
impact on the global TNCs average costs and aluminium prices (the share of 
mining and drying of bauxite in the total aluminium cost had been only 7% and 
that added by alumina refining of 21%). 
A third factor was the competitiveness of Jamaican bauxite being its 
cost lower than in Guyana, Guinea and Australia (by U.S. $ per ton 10, 9 and 
33, respectively). After the introduction of the new levy, the cost of alumina 
per ton in Jamaica rose from USJ8> 23 to about 33 which was almost equal to the 
cost in Guyana and much less than in Australia, thus removing only part of the 
economic rents of the TNCs. 
Fourth, the Jamaica Bauxite Commission formed in 1972 improved the information 
base of the government spending nearly two years examining operating and financial 
conditions within the industry and differences among the various TNCs. That 
period of pre-negotiation preparation and examination of the industry conditions 
faced by the government greatly improved its bargaining capacity breaking with 
traditional postures of political and phychological dependence inherited from 
the colonial area and removing largely the element of bluff from government 
TNC relations. 
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A fifth important factor was the formation of the International Bauxite 
Association (IBA), in 1974s by Jamaica, Suriname, Guinea, Guyana, Australia, 
Sierra Leone and Yugoslavia, joined later by the Dominican Republic, Haiti, 
Ghana and Indonesia. In 1975, the IBA countries accounted for 73/o of total 
world bauxite production. One of the purposes of this association was to present 
a united front of all bauxite exporting countries to the TNCs. To the extent 
that they were successful, the foreign firms' diversification of bauxite 
sources would be neutralized. In the 1974-1975 period, such neutralization 
appeared to have been successful, particularly owing to the fact that the 
government of an important alternative source country—Australia—had recently 
adopted a pro-Third World attitude reflecting its concern about foreign control 
of its own natural resources. 
Sixth, Jamaica faced, in 1970s, a more diversified world market for 
bauxite and alumina, characterized by entry of several new U. S. firms in the 
late 1960s and more rapidly increasing Japanese and European demand, even with 
occasional purchases by the Soviet Union and, projects of the government to 
enter at into joint ventures with other Caribbean and developing countries 
(see below). 
Finally, the consequences of the 1973 oil crises resulted in a severe 
balance of payments constraints, which had been only partially offset by 
other exports, particularly of sugar. In this difficult situation, the 
development objectives of the government made increased tax revenue essential. 
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b) Renegotiation and new fiscal legislation in the bauxite industry 
of Jamaica in 1974 
Prior to 1974, the TNCs had rarely paid more than U.S.® 2 per ton of 
bauxite. The Jamaican government imposed a .novel method of taxation—a 
production levy imposed on all bauxite produced (including that refined 
locally in alumina) and fixed as a percentage of. the price of primary aluminium 
ingots in the U.S. market. The government's original requirement was to fix 
the levy at 0. &/o for aluminium prices up to 35 cents per pound with escalation 
for prices higher than that level. The TNCs accepted the principal of the levy 
but encountered with an offer of 3. 5°/o share. The negotiations broke down and 
the government legislated the new fiscal terms, setting the production levy 
at 7.5% for the financial year 1974-1975 which signified a yield of U. S. $ 12 per 
ton of bauxite or a sixfold increase. 
The TNCs Opposition to the new bauxite levy and claims against Jamaica 
at the International Centre for,Setting Investment Disputes, were related with 
the sudden rise in the cost of energy and particularly with the fear of 
demonstration effect on other bauxite producing countries, which on final 
account proved'to be fully justified. 
The TNCs later adjusted to the increased bauxite tax passing it over 
to the consumer prices of aluminium and becoming in effect tax collectors for 
the government. They concentrated their counter-strategies in continuous 
shifting of bauxite activities to other producer countries and pressure on 
rebates of the tax rate which in real terms decreased from original 7.5% to 
6.6°/o in 1978 and further possible rebates are presently negotiated with TNCs, 
The total tax yield was in 1978 U.S. $185 million, or slightly more than in 
1974, due to price increase of aluminium and in spite of output setbacks 
(see below). 
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c) The ownership participation policy of Jamaica 
In addition to the increased bauxite levy the Jamaican government 
acquired ownership participation in the operations of the aluminium companies 
operating in that country. The arrangement is one of non-controlling 
participation because management and marketing remain the exclusive 
responsability of the TNCs and the output of bauxite and alumina production 
is available to them for processing in the United States. The non-controlling 
participation, taken together with substantial tax yields create a mutuality 
of interest between the TNCs and the government, which guarantees secure 
bauxite supplies to the former and assures increased revenues to the later. 
In the agreements, with Kaiser and Reynolds the bauxite land was bought at 
book value compensation and, in turn, the government guaranteed a 40 year supply 
of bauxite from it at a yearly rent corresponding to 7% of the purchase price. 
Furthermore, the government bought 51% of the mining operations assets and 
retained option to purchase also a share of the assets in alumina refining on 
the same terms, that is at book value. An additional important part of the 
package deal was that the TNCs dropped their claims against the new tax policy 
at ICSID, which put pressure on other protesting TNCs obliging them finally 
to drop also their own suits. The negotiating power of the government stemmed, 
in this case, from the fact that Kaiser and Reynolds were strongly dependent 
on Jamaica's bauxite (58% and 57% of their respective world production of 
bauxite). 
In the agreements with ALCOA and ALCAN (which depended by 11% and 55% 
respectively on Jamaica's bauxite) the government acquired 6% of the assets of 
ALCOA and 7% of those of ALCAN, including all activities in mining and refining, 
and all their unused mineral properties. 
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The joint ventures with the TNCs provide the government with a share 
of the annual alumina production (110.000 tons). 
The main effects of these agreements are: 
(i) The companies have in the past, acquired much more surface lands 
than they needed for access to bauxite deposits and the extensive 
land belonging to them was frequently scattered all over the island. 
The purchase by the government of some 195,000 acres of lands will 
enable to rationalize land use as a precondition for sound agricultural 
development; 
(ii) Although the Kaiser and Reynolds Agreements do not in any significant 
was affect operations of these two companies in Jamaica, they are 
mutually advantageous to both the Government and the Companies 
creating a common interest in maintaining production levels and 
securing the TNCs inputs. Moreover Jamaica's non-controlling 
interest of 51 per cent enables the Government to monitor and 
influence the TNCs operations by virtue of the presence of government 
appointees on the Board of Directors; 
(iii) The acquisition price of the written down book value of assets is 
relatively low and the negotiated government rates of return of 
15% (Kaiser) and 12% (Reynolds) are in excess of the cost of the 
borrowed capital at 8.5 per cent, 
(iv) In the case of the ALCOA and ALCAN agreements, Jamaica also has 
no control in the JAM/̂ -C0 and JAMALCAN joint ventures. However, 
the government will benefit by virtue of possession of its own 
alumina which will be sold to non-traditional markets. Furthermore, 
the Government has options on expansion of alumina capacity under 
the terms of the ALCOA Agreement. 
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d) New negotiations with TNCs in Jamaica 
The upward movement in the Jamaican Levy, indexed to the strong increases 
in primary aluminium prices since 1974, has placed Jamaica into a precariously 
high—cost situation vis-a-vis the availability of bauxite and alumina to 
the TNCs from other sources. The average realized price of aluminium ingot, 
used to obtain Jamaica's statutory bauxite levy, has moved from U.S.$38.8 cents per 
pound in 1975 to 60,0 in 1979. The levy is set at U.S.Sper ton 20.23 for 1979 
or almost twice as much as in 1974 (u. S. $ 11.2). 
For this reason, the Government abolished in May 1978 the discriminatory 
dual exchange rates introduced in April 1977 by which the TNCs were obliged 
to purchase Jamaican currency at a basic rate of J$1 = U.S.$1 while other 
purchasers operated at a devalued special rate of J$1.00 = U.S. $0.80. The 
objective of the dual exchange rate was to subsidise the import of essential 
goods for the population. While this scheme was justified in terms of social 
justice, the trade-off came in terms of an escalating reluctance of the TNCs 
to undertake necessary expenditures to maintain the alumina production levels. 
In May 1979, the Minister of Finance of Jamaica announced that 
negotiations were to be opened with the bauxite companies with a view to 
increasing their incentives for increased production. He conceded that the 
country had been losing its share of the world market because the bauxite levy, 
in spite of its advantages,was established at a higher level than that of other 
countries. The talks concerning an adjustment of the levy are presently 
proceeding. It is understood that Jamaica is basically asking the foreign 
companies to expand bauxite production by 2 million tons, while maintaining 
current total levy yields—implying a corresponding reduction in the levy rate. 
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e) Overall effects of the new fiscal policy in Jamaica 
Government revenues generated by the industry increased sixfold after 
the imposition of the bauxite production levy of 1974, from U. S, $ 29,9 million 
in 1973 to Li. S, S 178 million in 1974. Total budget yields from the levy and 
royalties were in 1974 U.S.I 185.4 million increasing to 193.0 million in 1978 
and reaching a total of 850 million throughout the five years (1974-1978). 
As a result, the snare of the bauxite and alumina industry in government budget 
resources increased from 8.7 per cent in 1973 to 42.2% in 1974. \J After 1975, 
general taxation rates and tax yields rose, while the levy yield fell, reducing 
the industry's contribution to government recurrent revenues to 29°/o in 1975 and 
in 1976. By 1977, 'bauxite production levels had partially.recovered from 
the disaster year of 1976 (aluminium prices reached 51 cents per lb) and the 
industry contributed 33 per cent to the government's recurrent revenue. This 
ratio is likely to be marginally higher in 1978. Total returhed value to 
Jamaica (including salaries, supplies, materials and other services) has 
increased from $ 120. 5 million in 1973 to $ 383. 1 million in 1978 and its 
share in total exDort value of bauxite and alumina reached 78°/o in 1978 as 
compared with 52% in 1973. 
The returned value from the bauxite industry constitutes the single most 
important source of foreign exchange to Jamaica. Given the severe balance of 
payments probl 
ems, the dependence of the country on company decisions concerning 
local production levels places the government into a significantly weaker 
bargaining position that it enjoyed in 1974. 
\J This comparison is not formally correct, insofar the levy is not 
considered to 
be recurrent revenus, but an input into the Capital 
Development Fund of the country. Substantively, however, the levy 
is a source of earned fiscal revenue and is being used to finance 
also government's recurrent expenditure. 
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Two additional factors should be taken in account! the simultaneous 
increase in TNCs earnings and, on the other hand, of import prices. Taking 
the first factor, the aggregate net income of ALCOA, ALCAN, Reynolds and Kaiser 
increased from U. S. $ 569 million in 1974 to 865 million in 1978, or by slightly 
more than a half, as compared with the increase of levy and royalty paid to 
the Jamaican Government increasing in the same period from U.S.® 185 to 193 
million or by only 4^ This illustrates the fact that the foreign companies 
passed on the increased tax cost to the consumer prices reducing this way also 
\ the previous cost advantage cf Jamaican bauxite vis-a-vis other producer 
r ni intrif-.s. 
The ofcjcond important additional factor is the erosion of the g&ins rrom 
the bauxite and alumina industry due to quickly rising import prices. The 
returned value to Jamaica in 1978 is only by less than a half greater as it 
was in 1972—if account is taken of rising import prices. While it is obvious 
that this situation would have been immeasurably worse, were it not for the 
levy yield, the fact remains that current options available to the country with 
respect to its bauxite resources are severely circumscribed by the ability of 
the TNCs to obtain bauxite from other sources, and by the complex and close 
relations between them and international capital centers—markets—without 
whose finance Jamaica cannot develop and independent national industry», 
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4. The nationalization policy of Guyana 
In' the first period of political independence, the relationship between 
the Guyanese government and the TNCs, principally ALCAN was determined as 
much by political factors as by economic development needs. ALCAN recognizing 
the new political "climate" had agreed to build a local aluminium smelter 
using electricity generated from a new hydroelectric plant. In August, 1968, 
a United Nations sponsored report stated that the project was both economically 
and technically feasible. ALCAN claimed, however, that it had not been shown 
that aluminium could be produced at competitive world prices and rejected the 
construction of the smelter. The issue of the role of ALCAN's DEMBA in Guyana 
became one of the most important factors of the new nation state political 
consensus. The issue on which all political and social groupings agreed was 
the national control over ALCAN's DEMBA. The universality of this perception 
throughout the country determined the range of bargaining options for the 
government and became an important factor of its negotiating capacity and a 
tool of pressure in the negotiations with TNCs, as well. 
The four main objectives publicly declared by the government included 
government's majority participation and operational control of DEMBA, compensation 
of the transfered assets based on officially declared book value, payments for 
the purchase of equity from future after-tax profits and entering in effect 
of the new agreement as of January 1, 1971» 
In the formal negotiations ALCAN made a number of counter-proposals 
for the expansion of the calcined bauxite activities (bearing in mind Guyana's 
almost world monopoly control in this commodity), government finance of this 
expansion through a new joint venture company with 51.% participation in the 
ownership by ALCAN retaining the operational control in the hands of TNC» 
On February 23, 1971, the Government terminated negotiation with ALCAN and 
announced the decision to nationalize DEMBA and establish a public enterprise 
GUAYABAU„ 
The nationalization of DEMBA imposed by the government, corresponded to 
the political conditions of the country and was not negotiable. On the other 
hand, this was not the case of the terms of nationalization and, particularly, 
the amount and conditions of compensation and future linkages between the two 
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parties. Since Guyana needed both the TNCs support for the marketing of 
bauxite and private and public financial resources from industrialized countries 
for her development needs, the Guyanese government had to agree on a compensation 
formula acceptable to ALCAN. High amount and rigorous schedule of compensation 
payments and a denial of co-operation for the operation and marketing activities 
of the nationalized industry became the major counter-strategy of the TNC. 
ALCAN tried also to get support from the Western Hemisphere home countries 
of TNCs. The United States government in fact expressed its disapproval of the 
Guyanese government compensation program by abstaining in a vote on a $5.4 
million World Bank loan for the country. It was concerned not only with the 
future fate of U.S. company, Reynolds in Guyana (which had been nationalized 
later in 1975), but also wanted to give support to a "reasonable compensation 
formula" for nationalization, bearing in mind the demonstration effect of the 
Guyanese case for other developing countries. 
In the final agreement between the government and ALCAN, signed in July, 
1971, DEMBA's gross value of assets for the purpose of compensation was 
estimated at TTS$ 80 million as "medium" compromise between US$ 46 million, 
official book value, backed as a basis for compensation by the government, 
and US$ 114 million required by ALCAN as "commercial value" of the nationalized 
assets. Payment for the compensation was to be made out of government revenue 
funds, rather than out of future profits of the company (as required originally 
by the government). 
An important conclusion emerging from the analysis of the conflict 
between Guyana and ALCAN is that short-term economic factors are in certain 
political conditions less important determinants of the process of negotiation,. 
In order to understand the capacity to negotiate of both the government and 
the TNCs, it is necessary to evaluate all the factors of their actions - both 
economic and political. On the other hand, the endowment of exceptionally 
high grade ores suitable for the production of calcined refractory bauxite in 
which Guyana enjoys a near world monopoly enabled GUYABAU to survive the 
reduction in its production and the squeeze with respect to the rather 
unfavourable prices, at which it has been forced to sell its metal grade 
bauxite and alumina. Although Guyana's production of metal grade bauxite is 
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not large, and modest amounts have been sold to socialist countries, there is 
little doubt that ALCAN has indicated its displeasure with Guyana's course 
of action, by exercising its economic power over the market for bauxite and 
alumina. 
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5, Short-term economic impact of the new agreements and 
policies in Guyana and Jamaica 
The examination of the economic impact of recent governmental policies 
and agreements with TNCs is difficult and necessarily tentative» First, if 
a new policy or agreement were to lead to an immediate reduction in economic 
benefits for the country, such reduction may well be accepted by the 
government as a short-term cost of obtaining more permanent political and 
economic goalss reflected in the nation's sovereignty over her main economic 
resource» Fundamental alterations in the industrial structure and the 
distribution of the means of production necessarily require a transition 
period» Secondly, the period of the mid 1970s was characterized by the 
beginning of the energy crisis and world economic recession with retraction 
in levels of international trade which had a negative impact on economic 
activity in Caribbean» 
In both Guyana and Jamaicas the level of bauxite output fell in the 
post-negotiation period» Bauxite production in Guyana fell by 1„7% yearly 
between 1970 and 1977* As a result the long-term trend of diminishing share 
of the two Caribbean countries of the total IBA output had been accelerated 
(Guyana from 16°/o in 1960 to 11% in 1970 and further to 6% in 1977 and Jamaica 
with respective shares of 37% in 1960, -30% in 1970 , 26% in 1973 and 18% in 1976)» 
The data seem to suggest that the aluminium transnationals continued and even 
reinforced the strategy pursued since early 1960s, of diversification of their 
sources of bauxite in order to reduce their vulnerability to the political risk 
in the Caribbean countries. Furthermore, the internal economic and social 
problems of the newly independent states, should be kept in mind, including the 
organization and management of a new and large public sector, wage and other 
social problems of the industry employees, etc. 
The analysis of output and export problems in the negotiation and 
post-negotiation period seems to indicate that; 
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The decrease in bauxite and alumina exports in Guyana and Jamaica 
was obviously related—outside the internal problems of both countries-—to 
the negative reaction and counter-strategies of TNCs in the negotiation and 
post negotiation period. This seems to be particularly true in the case of 
Canadian ALCAN, which shifted its input sourcing from the uncertain Caribbean 
markets to resources in countries of less political risk. 
Second, the same conclusion does not seem to apply to the U.S. aluminium 
companies, which increased their imports of Guyanese metalic bauxite, 
maintained the sourcing of calcined bauxite of the same origin and their 
monopsonistic position in Jamaican bauxite market and, finally, expanded 
considerably their imports of alumina from Jamaica. These differences in TNCs 
reactions and strategies could have reflected, on the one hand, the above 
analyzed harshness of the conflict with ALCAN in Guyana and, on the other hand, 
competitive attitudes among the aluminium TNCs, trying some of them to fill the 
vacuum in developing countries markets deserted by companies in conflict. 
Third, and most important, Guyana and Jamaica began to react to the 
TNCs traditional, and in time of Conflict reinforced, strategy of resource 
diversification, with their own national efforts in market diversification. 
This has been corroborated by the sharp increase of the role of European 
and Japanese markets in the export reorientation of both Caribbean countries 
and relates obviously with potential capacities of more independent 
Latin American, other developing regions and socialist countries markets. 
Finally, marketing strategies of bauxite exporting developing countries, 
aimed at decreasing the oligopolistic domination and resulting dependence on 
one or few TNCs and exploiting the inter-company competition, represent without 
any doubt one of the most important factors of their negotiating capacity * 
vis-a-vis transnational corporations. For this reason they require a more 
detailed study in future research activities. 
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6« Co-operation among bauxite producer and other Latin American countries 
a) International Bauxite Association 
Co-operation among bauxite producer countries is an important condition 
for the success of host government policies vis-a-vis TNCs, In the case of 
increasing taxation it was necessary to react to the TNCs counter-strategies 
in shifting their short-term sourcing to less "radical" countries or 
threatening to do so. An examination of the taxes and levies imposed by the 
member countries of the International Bauxite Association suggests that they 
result in roughly similar landed costs at U.S. ports. Jamaica's bauxite levy 
is higher than that of Suriname and that of Guinea is approximately half the 
Jamaican because of differences in production and ocean transport costs. The 
International Bauxite Association has been a valuable instrument- of contact 
and information among bauxite producing countries helping them to avoid the 
TNCs playing one producer country against the others. 
b) Joint ventures in production of bauxite and alumina 
Another important factor of increased bargaining capacity vis-a-vis 
TNCs through horizontal co-operation had been the endeavors of Jamaica and 
other Caribbean producer and Latin American consumer countries to establish 
joint ventures for the development of bauxite and alumina industry using 
jointly the availability of resources of bauxite, cheap energy, industrial 
skill of consumer countries with larger markets (Mexico, Venezuela) and 
avoiding the control of TNCs, not withstanding their investment and 
technical co-operation through "arm-length" contracts. 
Several joint ventures had been under considerations an alumina plant 
in Jamaica of a capacity from 600 000 to 900 000 tons, jointly owned by 
Jamaica, Mexico and Venezuela; an aluminium smelter in Mexico jointly 
owned with Jamaica (160,000 tons) and CARIC0M aluminium smelter project to be 
located in Trinidad (200.000 tons) based on his natural gas, with alumina to 
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be supplied by Guyana and Jamaica,, These projects are small in comparison 
with the scale of operations of TNCs in the world terms but for the countries 
of the region signify a large potential capacity of a greater use -of their 
natural resources. 
In the middle of 1979 none of these joint venture projects was on stream. 
The Government of Mexico withdrew in 1978 from all previous contractual agreements 
related to the JALUMEX smelting project. After several years of study and 
negotiations the decision whether or not to implement the CARICOM project still 
has not been taken. The co-operation between Jamaica and Venezuela is presently 
limited to long term sales contract for alumina. The reasons of these problems 
and delays in the important field of horizontal co-operation in joint investment 
and production development require more detailed analysis. 
Among most important factors emerging from the negative experience of the 
Jamaica-Mexico joint venture seem to be the problems of developing countries in 
financing their shares of the venture. The same experience illustrates the 
position of TNCs in an adverse report on the escalation of costs of the Mexican 
smelter by ALCAN, the company which had been selected to construct the smelter 
although this TNC had previously found the Mexican smelter a feasible and 
economic project. In this context the role of international and regional finance 
organizations like the United Nations World Bank and Interamerican Development 
Bank with its project of risk-security fund for TNCs investing in Latin American's 
natural resources seems to be of highest priority. 
c) Long term sales contracts and co-operation of Jamaica with Venezuela, 
Algeria, Hungary and Soviet Union 
In August of 1977, Jamaica and Venezuela signed a seven year agreement 
whereby Jamaica undertakes to supply Venezuela with a total of one million 
tons of alumina with annual delivery of 150,000 tons for the first six years 
and final 100,000 tons in 1984. The agreement is currently being renegotiated, 
on terms comparable with prices offered by Venezuela's other alumina 
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suppliers—Metallgesselleschaft, Billiton and Phillips Brothers, acting as 
purchasing agents for the Venezuelan state company. Another cause of the 
uncertainty had been the uncooperative attitude by ALCAN which in the mid 
1979 still not confirmed the "back-to—back" agreement with the government of 
Jamaica to produce and sell the alumina destined for Venezuela although the 
company has in 1979 close to 300,000 tons of idle alumina capacity,, The 
Jamaica-Venezuela alumina sales arrangement is thus entirely dependent on 
ALCAN. Until the coming into effect of the Jamaican joint ventures with 
ALCOA and ALCAN which entitle the government to 110,000 of alumina ton per 
year, Jamaica has no alumina of its own and has to come to terms with the 
TNCs controlling the mining and refining capacity of the country. For this 
reason the Government, of Jamaica has been exploring the possibilities of 
revitalizing the project related with the construction of a state-owned 
alumina refinery in South Manchester, with capacity of 600,000 tons, on the 
basis of long term sales contracts with Algeria, Hungary and Soviet Union,, 
In April of 1979 a govemamental mission signed a long term agreement 
for a sale of 250,000 tons of alumina per year with the Soviet Union 
commencing approximately in 1984, the year in which the new alumina plant 
would come on stream. Additionally, previously negotiated long term 
agreements with Hungary and Algeria for the sale of 150,000 tons yearly to 
each of these two countries, also commencing in 1984 have been reconfirmed,, 
Thus Jamaica would deliver, since 1984, some 550.000 tons of alumina per year 
to non-traditional markets, a volume almost corresponding to the projected 
capacity of the new alumina refining plant. 
None of these agreements are as yet contractual. Algerian alumina 
requirements are contingent upon the construction of a 127,000 tons per 
year smelter to be fuelled by natural gas and constructed with Soviet Union 
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technology and credits at M9Sila, about 100 miles from Algiers. Hungarian 
long term alumina purchases relate to plans to expand that.country's 
aluminium industry. Hungary's commitments to buy Jamaican alumina are 
contingent upon the agreement to utilize Hungarian technology, machinery 
and equipment for the construction of the new South Manchester plant which has 
to begin at the end of 1979. The plant with 600,000 tons capacity will be fully 
owned by Jamaica Bauxite Mining Ltd. on behalf of the Government of Jamaica. 
Aluterv-FKI of Hungary which did the feasibility study on the JAVEMEX project, 
are the designers and process engineers, and Hungarian export credit facilities 
amounting to $250 million have been arranged for the supply of equipment 
necessary for the project. In addition to suppliers credit for plant and 
equipment provided by Hungary, there is need to raise additional amount of 
some other $250 million of loans given the restricted capacity of Jamaica to 
borrow both domestically and abroad. As for the international capital market, 
the long term sales contracts to socialist countries are not normally accepted 
as collateral for the financing of mineral resource projects. However, there 
exists a possibility that Hungary, which has a expanding aluminium industry 
may be able to play a key role in providing the necessary bank financing. 
In order to transport the alumina to Soviet Union's ports the Government 
of Jamaica has announced the expansion of its Merchant Marine in co-operation with 
the Government of Norway for acquiring new vessels. This would represent a 
further step in the forward linkage of the industry. 
In addition to the long term agreements, two new short term sales of 
200,000 tons of alumina per year were obtained by Jamaica from the Soviet Union 
and Hungary in April 1979. As in the case of the Venezuelan sales agreement, 
alumina will have to be obtained from the TNCs operating in Jamaica until the 
joint ventures with ALCOA and ALCAN come into force. 
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R . TIN INDUSTRY IN BOLIVIA AND LINKAGES WITH TNCs 
The tin industry has a leading role in the economy of Bolivia. 
Its strategic importance for the economic and social development of the 
country is reflected in the share of total export and public budget incomes 
which had been in 1978 52% and 18% respectively. The industry participation 
in domestic National Product and employment has been 5% and 3.5% in the same 
year. 
1. Nationalization of tin mining in 1952 
In the initial period of Bolivian mining throughout the first quarter of 
this century TNCs did not expand in Bolivian tin mining as in other mineral 
producing countries of the region. The mining was initiated by Chilean and, 
on a lesser scale, British entrepreneurs with no direct relation with TNCs. 
Later in the 1920s the industry was dominated by a Etolivian national, Simán I» 
Patino, who bought out most of the foreign capital invested in tin mining, and 
organized in 1924 the Patino Mines and Enterprises Consolidated Inc., under the 
laws of Delaware, United States which progressively converted in a large-scale 
transnational tin mining corporation integrated from the exploitation of mines 
to the smelting and refining of tin and with mines in Bolivia, Malaysia and 
Nigeria, as well as main tin smelting plants of the world in Germany, 
United Kingdom, Malaysia, Nigeria and Australia. Moreover, in order to ensure 
the transport of ore exploited in Bolivia to smelters in the United Kingdom, he 
assumed control of the Compañía Sud Americana de Vapores. 
During the first two decades of this century, tax revenue obtained from 
mining was very small, which permitted the building up of large personal 
fortunes while the State did not receive the proper income. It was in the 
mining entrepreneurs8 interests that this state of affairs should not change; 
hence their gradually increasing participation in the country's politics. It 
was not until the beginning of the 1920s that a tax was imposed on mining profits, 
invested capital and exports. On the other hand, the Supreme Decree of June 1939 
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which established that foreign exchange obtained from mineral exports should be 
handed over to the Central Bank was derogated by the subsequent government in the 
same year. 
The low price of tin during the Second World War and in the early 
post-war years, social disputes and the transnational expansion of the Patino 
group on the basis of Bolivia's mining wealth continued to mobilize the 
country's public opinion increasingly against Patino and the other two "tin 
barons" (Hochschild and Aramayo). The mining entrepreneurs even tried to 
impose their own presidential candidate in the 1951 elections. After the new 
Government of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement assumed in April 1952 it 
nationalized the three large-scale mining groups by a decree of October that year. 
They represented together over 70°/o (Patino Group over 44%) of the country's total 
production. 
The nationalized mining groups failing in their legal attempt to embargo 
Bolivia's mining exports abroad took advantage of the fact that nearly all the 
tin concentrates would be arriving at the British Williams Harvey and Co. smelter, 
controlled by the Patino group. They imposed on the Government of Bolivia a 
compulsory discount of 10% on the gross value of the ore smelted in this smelter. 
The discount was being retained as an advance on the compensation which the 
Bolivian Government would pay for the value of the nationalized mines. The 
total payments until August 1961 reached U. S. $ 20 million. The discounts ended 
with the introduction of the Triangular Plan for reconditioning the nationalized 
mines. 
2. The post-nationalization problems and development of public enterprise 
C0MIB0L 
In 1952 the Bolivian Government created the Corporacidn Minera de Bolivia 
(COMIBOL) to run the nationalized mines. In the initial ten years period after 
nationalization the tin production in Bolivia declines from 32 000 tons in 1950 
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to 20.000 tons in 1960, or by 4,6% in yearly average, but then recovered in 1970 
to 30 000 tons surpassing the prenationalization level in 1977. Bolivia retained 
this way its highly predominant position in the region (81.5% of the total) 
although the production of tin in Brazil (Ftandpnia) expanded from 1 300 tons in 
1960 to 6 400 tons in 1977, reaching 16% of Latin American tin production» 
The decline in tin production after the nationalization can be attributed 
to several main factors. In the first place, it was a continuation of the 
declining trend from the alltime peak Bolivian production reached during the 
Second World War, aggravated furthermore by the contraction in tin consumption 
during 1950s. Secondly, and due partly to a lack of exploration activities the 
quality of the ground mined deteriorated causing a decline in the tin content of the 
ore. Thirdly, there was an exodus of 170 of the 200 foreign engineers after 
nationalization. Serious management problems—common to all newly nationalized 
firms—had been aggravated by the fact that C0MIBCL took over some 17 plants 
belonging to the three nationalized enterprises and being of varying size, 
quality of ore, obsoletness of equipment and infrastructure, profitability, etc. 
Finally, among external factors contributing to the decline in production were 
the marketing problems linked with TNCs domination, the termination of 
United States stockpile purchases around 1958, followed by the export controls 
imposed by the International Tin Council during 1958-1960. 
The upturn of Bolivian tin industry in 1960s was facilitated by the 
improvement in the international climate in favour of developing countries. 
An expression of this was a Triangular Plan introduced in 1961 and involving 
the Governments of Bolivia, the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the Inter-American Development Bank. This plan covering the 1961-1971 period, 
envisaged the recapitalization of C0MIB0L through external loans, the > 
strengthening of management and a substantial reduction of surplus labour» The 
steady increase in production and productivity since 1961 was partly due to this 
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plan and made it possible to repay the external loans until 1976» At the 
same time, this plan contributed to the final settlement with nationalized 
TNCs and ended the compensation payments in 1961. 
CQMIBQL has b;?en reaching continuous profit and increasing net income 
throughout the 1965-1975 period contributing importantly to the state budget» 
Total taxes paid by CQMIBOL in 1974 amounted to Bolivian Peso 873 million in 
comparison with 37 million in 1965 and 387 and 221 millions paid in 1974 by 
medium and small mining enterprises respectively. The economic achievements of 
COMIEDL have been positively influenced by the substantial increase of world 
prices, but, on the other hand, it had to bear increasing costs caused by 
sharp inflationary process without any change in the exchange rate of U. S. 
currency which had been maintained since the devaluation of Bolivian Peso 
in 1972. 
3. National development of tin smelting 
At the time of nationalization in 1952, the bulk of Bolivian tin 
concentrates went to the Williams Harvey smelter in the United Kingdom owned by 
the group of Patino (Consolidated Tin Smelters]. In the pre-nationalization 
period Patino had no interest in building a smelter in Bolivia declaring in the 
Annual Report of Patino Mines and Enterprises Consolidated Inc. for 1938,; 
"It is cheaper to smelt and refine tin in the plants of Williams Harvey and Co. 
in Bootle, near Liverpool, than anywhere else. Determining factor is the long and 
unequalled experience of Williams Harvey in the treatment of the complex Bolivian 
ores in which they have specialized for over 25 years". 
In the 1960s the Government of Bolivia came to the conclusion that the 
country should build its own tin smelters, not only to earn additional foreign 
exchange from forward linkage operations tut also to be less dependent on specific 
foreign smelters and by implication, foreign markets. In 1966 the State 
enterprise Empresa Nacional de Fundiciones, ENAF, was established obtaining a 
monopoly of producing and exporting of refined metal. Construction of a tin smelter 
began in that year and in January 1971, ENAF put on stream the refinery at Vinto, 
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with an initial capacity of 7,500 tons. The plant was constructed with German 
suppliers' credits by Kloekner Humbolt Deutch, a metal and engineering group 
which also constructed the refinery for the Indonesian Peltim smelter at Muntok. 
In 1975, Bolivia was still highly depended on foreign smelters for 
refining its tin concentrates. Only one quarter ofthe total sales of concentrates 
had been processed in the national ENAF smelter in Vinto. The remainder was 
exported to different foreign smelters particularly in the U.S. , United Kingdom, 
Spain and Brazil. The foreign smelters refining Bolivian tin concentrates were 
mainly large and integrated TNCs with world-wide marketing of tin metal: The 
Long Horn smelter pertaining to Wah-Chang Corporation and then sold to the 
Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation (31% of the C0MIB0L 1975 tin production); 
the Capper Pass and Son Ltd. in United Kingdom (24% of the C0MIB0L tin output); 
and the German Berzelius Metallhutten Gesellschaft m. b. h. smelter in Ctiisburg, 
owned by the Metallgesellschaft A. G. , smelting tin concentrates produced by 
medium-scale miners. Only small quantities of Bolivian concentrates have been 
smelted in Brasilian Volta Redonda smelter controlled by Consolidated Tin 
Smelters (Patino). 
Presently the tin smelter in Vinto which exported 16 000 tons in 1978 
is being expanded to a capacity of 20 000 tons per year. While this smelter has 
been designed for the treatment of high grade tin, a new plant is being constructed 
at the same site for the treatment of low grade tin with a capacity of approximately 
10 000 tons. Both the expansion of the existing smelter and the construction of 
the new one are being undertaken by Kloeckner Industries, the second one in 
conjunction with Paul Bergsoe of Denmark. Thus, by the beginning of 1980s 
\J There is discussion of the possibility of USSR Machino Export Enterprise 
participation in the construction of the second smelter. In this case 
the new smelter would provide an interesting example of joint venture; 
the State enterprise ENAF co-operating with private companies in Germany 
and Denmark, and with the USSR state enterprise (Mining Magazine, March 
1977). 
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Bolivia will have a tin smelting capacity of some 30 000 tons, capable of 
smelting domestically all of its tin concentrates production. 
The expansion of tin smelter's capacity throughout the 1970s made it 
possible to increase the output of tin metal from 700 tons in 1970 to 
16 000 tons in 1978 accounting for more than a half of total production of 
tin in concentrates. About two thirds of ENAF's tin is supplied by CQMIBOL 
and the rest by medium mines. The small mines supply little to ENAF due to low 
tin content of their concentrates. 
During the initial years of its operations ENAF encountered with 
accounting losses similarly as CQMIBOL owing partly to large overhead costs 
of the infrastructure built for the future capacity of the smelter. Another 
important reason was the inflationary process and freezing of the foreign 
exchange rate, since 1972, mentioned above in relation with C0MIBCL. 
As in the case of CQMIBOL's mining operations, it is important to realize 
that forward linkage corresponding to ENAF smelting is important not only for 
gains in a narrow sense (profits), but particularly for internalization of incomes 
originated in the tin industry. In this manner, the retained value is definitely 
enhanced by increasing the local value added, even if accounting-wise the 
smelter suffers losses. Of course, this assertion does not deny the importance 
of public enterprise efforts to decrease production and other costs contributing 
thus more to the country's development. In addition, the smelting of tin 
domestically may lead in the future to further forward linkage development 
such as fabrication of tin based products. Finally, local smelting would increase 
the negotiating capacity of the government vis-a-vis tin TNCs and their still 
strong marketing power. 
4. TNCs control over marketing of Bolivian tin 
The present problems of tin marketing in Bolivia are largely associated 
with the low grade and not easily marketable tin concentrates proceeding mainly 
from small mines. Their sales are limited to the foreign refineries specializing 
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in low grade processing, such as the Texas smelter in the United States. 
Any lasting improvement in the market position of the Bolivian tin 
industry depends on the completion of the new low grade smelter at Vinto«, 
The state owned mining bank Banco Minero (BAMIN), was established as 
the principal credit, marketing and technical assistance institution, including 
provision of equipment and current inputs, for the private and especially small 
mines. BAMIN mainly undertakes spot sales for relatively small individual 
shipments to the low grade smelters in Europe and through international trading 
firms acting as principals and thus excluding mineral suppliers from decisions over 
timing and destination of sales. 
The international trading firms which are most active in Bolivia are; 
Phillip Brothers, C, Tennat and Sons, Metal Traders and Sud Americana de 
Minerales y Metales, all important traders in the LME. Phillip Brothers has 
also exclusive marketing of the tin concentrates from mines pertaining 
previously to Grace and Co. which represent approximately one half of private 
Medium Scale Mines production. The marketing of Bolivian tin is thus 
still largely controlled by the powerful traders which dominate the LME. 
The actual distribution of gains at the market level, depends primarily 
on two factors: first, the process of price.formation in international markets 
and the bargaining power of governments in those markets, and second, the 
negotiations regarding the many discount clauses which can increase or reduce 
actual gains, given international prices. Although COMIBOL, ENAF and BAMIN 
combined have a sales volume large enough to exert a powerful bargaining position 
in the international markets, the government has to strengthen a co-ordinated 
marketing approach and the knowledge about international minerals and freight 
markets and particularly the forward price movements on the London Metal Exchange. 
In this sense a rather positive factor is that the tin sales are geographically 
diversified corresponding in 1975 to western european countries 41%, United States 
24%, Latin American countries 10% and socialist countries 12% of the total export 
volume. 
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5. Some aspects for interregional co-operation 
The tin industry in developing producer countries shows some important 
common characteristics which underline the opportunity of broader horizontal 
co-operation in this field. 
First, the developing countries accounted in 1977 for more than three 
quarters of the world production corresponding to Asia 52%, Latin America 18% and 
Africa 6%. On the other hand their share in the world consumption of tin was 
only 7%» 
Second, six developing countries (Bolivia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, 
Thailand and Zaire) accounted for .84% of world production of tin concentrates and 
almost 70% of the world production of tin metal in the first half of 1970s (as 
compared with 91% and 41% respectively in the first half of 1950s). The increasing 
proportion of tin smelted in developing countries is a reflection of their 
improving bargaining position. 
Third, three largest tin enterprises in the world are controlled by the 
governments of developing countries (P„T. Timah of Indonesia, C0MIB0L of Bolivia 
and Pernas of Malaysia) accounting together for almost one third of world 
production. 
Finally, the main common problem of the developing producer countries is 
the domination of international tin market by industrialized consumer countries, 
particularly through the markets at London and New York and the U. S. strategic 
stockpile operations. The international Tin Agreement has only marginally 
reduced the inestability of prices and producer incomes. It has endured while 
other agreements have failed, in part because it has lacked effective power 
(in the face of the United States strategic stockpile) to make critical price 
decisions which otherwise would have intensified producer-consumer conflicts. 
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C. THE CASE OF BANANA INDUSTRY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
1. The role of banana industry in the economies of Central America 
The Central American countries, as banana producers and exporters, may 
be divided into two groups; first, Guatemala and Nicaragua [particularly the 
latter) in which this activity is not of great importance in terms of its 
share in the gross national product (GNP), exports and employment generated? 
and, secondly, Honduras, Costa Rica and Panama where the situation is 
markedly different. 
In 1975, banana exports of Nicaragua and Guatemala were 1% and below 
of the GNP and less than 5% of total exports of goods. On the other hand, 
external sales of bananas by Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama represented 7%, 
4% and 3%,. respectively, of the GNP, and 28%, 16% (22% in 1978) and 22% of 
total exports. The share of Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama of world exports 
of banana were in the same year, 16%, 6% and 8%, respectively. 
In terms of employment, in Guatemala and Nicaragua the proportion of 
persons employed in the banana industry in relation to the economically 
active population was 0.3% only, in comparison with a high share of 
agriculture, 57% and 69%, respectively. In Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama 
the proportions of banana industry were 4%, 3% and 2%, respectively and 
much higher in agricultural employment (36%, 57% and 29%). 
Finally, it should be noted that the dependence of all the Central American 
countries on banana industry has gradually diminished in relation to the past, 
as a result of diversification of production and exports. This increased their 
capacity in the formulation and management of a banana policy and negotiations 
with TNCs in comparison with 1950s, when banana exports in Central America 
represented between 50% and 70% of the total exports of goods. On the other 
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hand, in spite of the lesser dependence on a single export commodity, in 
Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama the banana industry continues to play a 
crucial role in generating foreign exchange and absorbing significant levels 
of employment. 
The oligopolistic power exercised by TNCs in the banana industry of 
the Central American countries was moderated by the emergence of national 
producers even if they were generally associated with these corporations. 
Secondly, some countries of the region have established government bodies 
which have promoted important changes in connexion not only with production 
but also with the domestic transport, shipment and, to a lesser extent, 
packing of bananas. 
2. Participation of TNCs and national producers in banana production 
and exports 
In 1976, the TNCs still dominated directly 55% of all the banana land and 
64% of the total commodity exports in above analysed five Central American 
countries. The majority of national producers (with the exception of Honduras) 
was associated with TNCs with all resulting forms of dependence. 
The Associate Producer Program appeared to be a significant change in 
the operation strategy of TNCs in the region. They segmented this way the 
local market increasing the number of negotiable transactions between producing 
and purchasing banana for export. This way the banana TNCs disengaged themselves 
not only from the production risk but also from the social overhead in favour 
of their labour (education and health care, free housing, etc.). 
This strategy enabled the TNCs to spread the production risk (disease, 
natural disasters, market price fluctuations, etc.) over a great number of 
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local producers. At the same time it reacted to the U.S. Government 
antimonopolistic legislation and host countries criticism of their natural 
resources® foreign domination, as well. 
The dependence of associate producers on TNCs had been maintained by 
the control of production inputs and services and through long-term contracts 
in which the price but not quantity, was fixed for delivery of a specific 
grade of banana allowing the TNCs to determine total purchases and squeeze 
them in periods of over-supply. Control over the U.S. retail market guaranteed 
that local producers and third companies would not be able to purchase the excess 
fruit and increase competition. In periods of under-supply, the companies 
absorbed larger quasi-rents rather than sharing than with the producers. 
For this reason several Central American countries opposed the turning over 
of TNCs plantations to national producers arguing that the foreign companies 
themselves should continue bearing the inherent risk of the industry and 
providing the social services to the labour force. 
Greater involvement of Central American Governments in the banana 
industry has been progressively creating a countervailing power against the 
local producers dependence on TNCs. 
3. Role of the public sector 
Between the banana harvest and shipment there are several stages in 
which national producers have started to participate more actively and 
principally through the public or semi-public sector. In Costa Rica and Panama, 
national institutions participate in the supervision of packing of banana. 
The boxes and other materials are supplied by TNCs under agreements negotiated 
directly with the government bodies in Panama, and with public enterprise 
ASBANA in Costa Rica. 
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TNCs no longer control the domestic transport of the fruit. In Guatemala, 
Honduras and Panama the railways were nationalized and the TNCs have to pay for 
banana transport under the system of contract tariffs or fix rents. As a result 
of the nationalization of all the main terminals of the region and government 
sponsored expansion of ports banana shipments are currently under public control,, 
As to the marketing efforts had been made to export banana outside the 
TNCs' sphere of action but have not yielded the expected results. The attempts 
have been suspended after incurring in financial losses. At present only 
Panama is operating a national enterprise, the Corporación Bananera del Pacífico 
(COBAPA) which markets small quantities of bananas directly under a system in 
which one of the TNCs participates. Other marketing attempts, like that of 
Nicaragua, frustrated owing to financial losses related with low scale of 
production and shipments. After tvra years of losses, INFONAC transfered the 
shipments back to Standard Fruit. 
In apather Central American country, the enterprise concerned with 
independently promoting production established contacts with marketing 
enterprises in the United States and Canada, but the negotiations never 
materialized owing to the failure to solve the problem of maritime transport, 
since none of the parties was willing to be responsible for this stage. 
In short, the whole banana production of Central America, except for small 
quantities sold by Panamian COBAPA, continues to be marketed by transnational 
corporations, from which they obtain the major share of the income generated by 
this industry. 
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4. The new fiscal policy and TNCs reactions 
a) Union of Banana Exporting countries fUPEB) 
The chain of events which eventually led to the signing of the Union 
de Paises Exportadores de Banana (UPEB) agreement and new fiscal policies of 
Latin American countries were initiated in 1970 by a private group, the National 
Chamber of Banana Growers of Costa Rica. Following the urgings of independent 
producers of Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras, the governments of these countries, 
particularly Costa Rica and Panama, took over leadership of the movement for a 
Union of Banana Exporting Countries. After many preliminary meetings among the 
representatives of Central American countries,and Ecuador and Colombia, signed the 
Constitutive Agreement of UPEB had been signed on September 1974 by the governments 
of Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama. Dominican Republic acceded 
to the organization in February of 1976. 
The banana companies seemed to have been unconcerned about the early 
meetings of Central American governments leading to UPEB establishment. However 
when they announced plans to increase minimum prices and impose export taxes, 
the TNCs took action. For example, Castle and Cooke officials visited several 
Central American capitals to advise government officials not to impose the 
taxes. The President of Castle and Cooke also called upon the United States 
government to request that no taxes be imposed. Also, it has been reported that 
this company urged Ecuador not to impose a tax and not to participate further 
in discussions concerning the formation of a UPEB "cartel". In fact, Ecuador 
attended the preparatory meetings for UPEB establishment only as an observer and 
did not join the organization which has been used by the TNCs for splitting the 
unity of UPEB countries through threats of shifting the banana production to that 
country. 
The absence of Ecuador in UPEB led also to shift efforts towards securing 
higher prices and export limitations to the Intergovernmental Group on Bananas 
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of the FAO, a group in which Ecuador actively participates. .Wfefchin the 
Intergovernmental Group, there exists a Sub-Group of Exporters which includes 
not only the Central and South American exporters but also those in the 
Caribbean, Africa and Phillipines. On the other hand, UPEB has not taken 
any united action with respect to either banana pricing or output limitation 
since its inception. Its force has been principally in the joint evaluation 
and analysis of the bapana industry and interchange of information and ideas for 
action among the member countries. 
b) The new fiscal policy, TNCs counterstrategy and redistribution 
of gains 
The changes in the Central American banana industry in the mid 1970s 
reflected reinforcement of the bargaining capacity of host countries vis-a-vis 
TNCs through: (i) the establishment of regional producer organization 
UPEB defending member countries interests; (ii) renegotiation 
of the Governments share in the industry gains which although not achieving the 
original goals—increased substantially their foreign exchange and budgetary 
incomes and; (iii) creation or reinforcement of public sector organizations 
participating in, and controlling of, the banana activity and supporting the 
local associate producers diminishing this way their former unilateral dependence 
on TNCs. 
The decision taken by Panama, Costa Rica, and Honduras in April 1974 to 
link the creation of UPEB with the immediate introduction of a U.S. $1.00 per box 
tax on all banana exports would have caused an increase in the government revenues 
of those three countries of the order of U. S. $ 130 million, and increase in the 
export cost of bananas to the TNCs of the order of 60% and if passed on to 
consumers on a strictly cent-for-cent basis, an increase in the retail price 
of bananas of 2.5 cents per pound that is in the United States market from 16 to 
18.5 cents per pound or by 15.6%, 
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The counter-strategies of TNCs included curtailment and stoppage of 
banana exports in Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama, destruction of bananas 
and allegations of company pay-offs of government officials. In addition, 
Standard Fruit and other companies were involved in the decision taken by the 
U„ S„ Longshorement to boycott all imports and'exports of those countries 
imposing the export tax. 
The initial levels of tax were lowered successively in Honduras (to a 
scale going from 25 cents per box in 1974 to 50 cents per box in 1979); in 
Costa Rica (to 25 cents per box in 1974, later raised to 40 cents per box in 
1976). Subsequently, Guatemala also imposed the tax on a scale rising from 
35 cents per box in 1975 to 50 cents per box in 1978. 
The reasons given by the TNCs for the unacceptability of the tax were 
principally that bananas were not, like oil, an essential commodity in the consuming 
countries, and that consequently .the price increase implied by the tax would 
result in a disastrous fall in consumption levels assumming that the price 
elasticity of bananas at retail was greater than unity. The second principal 
argument was that the introduction of the tax would result in other countries 
not imposing it, principally Ecuador, gaining considerable comparative advantage 
and upsetting the competitive balance of the world banana market. Finally, 
the TNCs alleged that it was not possible to pass the tax on to consumers on 
a cent-by-cent basis due to resistance on the part of the buyers (ripeners and 
wholesalers), and due to the fact that distributional margins would move on a 
proportional rather than a linear basis, thus raising consumer prices by 
considerably more than the increase of the tax. 
All of these predictions proved more or less incorrect, although 
the foreign companies did obtain a reduction in the level of the tax. 
There was reduction of consumption in 1975, partially caused by the sudden 
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increase of the retail price of bananas, but also related to the economic 
recession of that year. In addition retail prices increased by considerably 
more than the reduced level of the tax eventually determined: from 16 to 
around 24 cents per pound in the United States. At the same time, and 
similarly to the case of the oil companies after the introduction of the 
OPEC export tax in January of 1974, the companies made far higher profits 
on bananas in 1975 than they had done in the preceding five years. 
The price elasticity of demand for bananas is evidently considerably 
less than unity because consumption in the year 1976 has recovered in all 
major importing countries to above pre-1974 levels; thus resuming the small 
but steady growth in consumption experienced over the last two decades. 
Finally, in spite of the non-accession of Ecuador to the UPEB, and in spite 
of the fact that that country did not raise an export tax (and on the contrary 
encouraged the companies to establish new long term contracts), in 1976 there 
has been a remarkable increase of market participation by the countries of the 
UPEB in the banana world market. 
In spite of the fact that the tax rates originally established were 
reduced, the tax yield increase for Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and 
Panama has been significant. In 1973, tax payments on exports of bananas in 
these countries represented about U.S.® 2 million, while 38 and 54 million 
had been collected in 1975 and 1976 respectively, which for the latter year 




1/ D. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS -
1. Similarity and diversity of the three cases under examination 
The cases of three export oriented primary commodities summarized 
above-—bauxite in Caribbean, tin in Bolivia and banana in Central America-
demonstrate in global terms increased bargaining capacity and more equal 
distribution of industry gains throughout the 1970s, in favour of Latin American 
host governments.• Nevertheless, meaningfull conclusions for developing 
countries policy alternatives vis-a-vis TNCs should take in account not only 
the similarity of governments common experience but their historical diversity, 
as well. The outstanding aspects of this similarity/diversity of bargaining 
situations seem to be related with the following issues: 
a) Commodity nature, its role in national economies and TNCs domination 
The industry and market nature of minerals—bauxite and tin—in comparison 
with perishable fruit—banana—is obviously different in a sense that the 
first ones and, particularly tin given its relatively high price per unit, 
are abject of the stockpile and even speculation strategies of TNCs and 
developed consumer countries (see the striking divergence between the U.S. 
strategic stockpile and ITC market power in tin), meanwhile banana require 
short-term (maximum 6 weeks) integrated operation since the harvest to the 
consumers tables. The commodity nature determines also broader alternatives 
for producer countries internalized forward linkage in the case of minerals 
than in that "of banana industry where given the limitation of end uses and 
further processing of the fruit, the producer countries forward linkage 
1/ Subject to discussion with government officials and experts in Bolivia 
and Jamaica and in the Interregional Expert Meeting at Bangkok. 
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extension would require to overcome the barriers of entry in the industrialized 
countries and TNCs dominated shipping, ripening and trading of bananas. 
The outstanding common feature of the post-war development of Latin America, 
including the three areas under examination, is their progress in industrialization 
and export diversification (including oil and different agricultural and 
mineral commodities) which practically eliminated the previous mono-product 
external dependance as typified by the Central American "banana republiques" 
of the pre-war period. 
Nevertheless, the bargaining capacity of Guyana,, Jamaica, Bolivia, 
\ 
Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama, vis-a-vis TNCs was in the 1970s still highly 
determined by their foreign exchange and government incomes resulting from 
bauxite, alumina, tin and banana industries. On the other hand, this same 
important role of primary commodities in the external balance of payments 
and the host countries social and economic progress influenced the political 
willingness of Latin American governments to increase the national sovereignty 
over natural resources exploited and/or highly dominated by some ten TNCs 
vertically and world-wide integrated in the aluminium, tin and banana 
industries (AUCOA, Reynolds, Kaiser, ALCAN, Pechiney and Alusuisse in bauxite 
industry, Patino group in tin industry and United Brands, Castle and Cooke 
and Del Monte in banana industry), 
b) International setting 
The general changes of the international climate characterized by the 
post-war process of political liberalization and decolonization, developing 
countries demands of New International Economic Order and their higher 
leverage in international organizations (reflected, for example, in the UNCTAD 
Integrated Programme for Commodities), the multipolarization of the world 
economy and OPEC countries success in improving their terms of trade, had 
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without any doubt an important positive impact on the bargaining capacity 
of Latin American countries whose governments and intelectual leaders (like 
Dr. R.Prebisch) played an important role in their shaping. However, taking 
in account the absence of international agreements in bauxite and banana and 
the continuing low market power of ITA reserves (in comparison with U.S. 
strategic stockpile), it may be supposed that the particular international 
factors influencing in the 1970s the Latin American governments bargaining 
capacity in the industries under study, had been mainly the world economic 
recession and inflation (leading, on the one hand to commodities price increase, 
particularly of tin but, on the other one, to balance of payments constraints 
due to "imported inflation" and lack of concessionary finance), second and, 
in a clearly positive sense, the diversification of the region's export 
markets with increased sourcing of raw materials by european countries 
(including the centrally planned ones of Eastern Europe) and, third the 
emerging and potential capacity of horizontal co-operation among developing 
countries themselves. These new linkages with market places relatively 
independent from TNCs world-wide vertical integration do not necessarily 
exclude the latter ones from their oligopoly market position, as will be seen 
below. 
c) Internal political setting 
Recognizing the importance of "objectively given" and more long term 
factors of host countries bargaining capacity, like - commodity nature, its 
role in the producer country's economy, world-wide TNCs sourcing and market 
oligopoly and changing international climate—one should accept that the specific 
historical situation of a given developing country—in all its political, 
ideological, social-economic, cultural and international aspects-—is definitely 
determinant in its attitudes and actions towards TNCs. Only this premise 
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can explain why Bolivia and Indonesia nationalized the tin industry in 
about 1950, or long before the New International Economic Order demands and 
OPEC countries breakthrough, why Guyana prefered bauxite industry nationalization 
instead of Jamaica's fiscal policies or, the continued Central American 
countries dependence on the three U.S. banana TNCs. Obviously, the objective 
of the Interregional Project on Primary Commodities is not to give preference 
to any of the political alternatives taken by the developing host countries 
governments, but to contribute to the interchange of experience from different 
policy-alternatives implications and effects. This will be tried below in 
evaluating the specific Latin American experience. 
2. Internalization of industry gains through forward linkage 
in commodities processing and marketing 
The securing of a greater degree of primary commodities processing within 
the developing producer countries on terms which ensure that their economies 
get a larger share of the "value added" through incomes from the TNCs, joint 
venture or wholly owned national processing facilities conformed an important 
policy goal of Latin American governments. The three cases under examination 
represent different features of governments and TNCs strategies: meanwhile 
in Bolivia Patino always prefered for "economic reasons" to maintain the 
dependence on his own Williams Harvey smelter in the United Kingdom, the 
aluminium TNCs in Caribbean—under the pressure of increased competition for 
bauxite resources—started alumina refining, particularly in Jamaica, just in 
the colonial period and frequently through joint ventures among themselves. 
The gains accrued by them resulted not only from decreasing production and 
transportation cost, but the onerous contract conditions imposed on host 
countries, as well. For example, even after Jamaica gained independence 
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and promoted the establishment of alumina plants (increasing alumina exports 
3 times between 1966 and 1972) the increased government incomes through tax 
payments did not materialize because of the TNCs capacity to record almost 
no profit from the new alumina plants by using, as in the case of bauxite, 
artificially low transfer prices. 
The improved bargaining capacity of Bolivia in the 1970s is reflected 
by the fact that by 1980 almost all tin concentrates produced in the country 
will be smelted locally in public enterprise ENAF néw plants terminating thus 
the previous dependence on foreign smelters and diminishing the dependence on 
TNC dominated marketing of the metal. Similar development is under way in 
Jamaica in co-operation with socialist countriesi as will be seen below. 
Contrary to the experience in tin and bauxite, the Central American banana 
industry shows the only modest progress in forward linkage integration through 
the local packing of bananas and related construction of plants for boxes 
production, a result of TNCs strategies reacting to the effects of Panama 
disease with new varieties of banana and their shipping in boxes. 
In all three cases major barriers of entry for the developing producer 
countries and their public agencies and enterprises were found in the field 
of commodities marketing where the TNCs dominate the distribution mainly 
through metal markets (tin), control of final fabrication (aluminium products) 
and strong influence on transport, ripening and retail trade of banana. 
3. Increased government incomes through new fiscal policies 
The new levy on bauxite production (including that refined in alumina) and 
increased export tax on banana imposed in 1974 by the governments of Jamaica 
and the Central American countries: Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama, later Guatemala, 
signified important increases in government budget incomes and in spite of 
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strong TNCs reactions and counterstrategies and resulting trade-offs with 
the governments, proved a significant shift in the balance of negotiating power 
between the two parties. Some outstanding aspects of both cases are: 
a) Jamaica's six fold increase of the bauxite levy, fixed as a percentage 
of the price of aluminium ingot in the U.S. market, brought an increase of 
total returned value from the industry by a half between 1972 and 19X (in real 
terms or, taking in account the rising import prices) contributing the industry 
in the last year a third of total government budget resources (9% in 1973). 
The tax yield increase in Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama was from 
U.S.$2 million in 1973 to 54 million in 1976. 
b) In both cases the initial TNCs counter-strategies included restriction 
and even stoppage or destruction (banana) of production and exports from the 
conflictive countries trying to shift the commodity sourcing to other areas, 
political pressures on host and home countries and recurrence to international 
bodies outside the host country jurisdiction. 
c) On host countries side, important factors were the relatively high 
dependence of TNCs on host countries supplies for the U.S. market and the 
technical and financial difficulties of a more radical and short term sourcing 
shift, the low share of producer countries in the final prices of aluminium 
and bananas making it possible to pass over the increased tax cost to the 
consumers without reducing the demand, the important information and co-operation 
factors given by the prenegotiation preparatives of the Jamaica Bauxite 
Commission and IBA and UPEB activities and, in the case of bauxite and alumina, 
the diversified world market. 
d) Finally, in both cases the initial legal imposition of increased taxes 
and the strong reactions by TNCs have been fallowed by renegotiations where 
both sides had to retrocede from their initial bargaining positions: the 
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governments decreasing the original tax rates goals /but retaining a substantial 
income increase, as shown in paint a) above? and the TNCs becoming tax collectors 
for the governments and being in principle both sides jointly interested in 
the industry progress. 
4. Increasing control of the industry by host countries governments 
and the role of the public sector 
The nationalization of the tin industry in Bolivia, in 1951, and of the 
bauxite industry in Guyana in 1972 and, the non-controlling ownership participation 
policy and joint ventures with TNCs of the mid 1970s in Jamaica, as well as 
the increase in the role of the public sector in all three case^ represent 
different approaches and aspects of major sovereignty of developing countries 
over their natural resources.and greater government control of commodity 
industries. Their outstanding aspects may be synthesized in following way: 
a) Jamaica's ownership participation policy (acquisition of TNCs land and 
using part of them for agricultural development, 51% share in mining operations 
of Kaiser and Reynolds and 6% and 7% share, respectively, of all assets—including 
alumina plants—of ALCOA and ALCAN establishing joint ventures and government 
share in alumina shipments) was in a certain sense a culmination of the previous 
difficult negotiations on the bauxite levy and did not signify a greater 
conflict with TNCs. 
b) On the other hand, the nationalizations in Bolivia and Guyana led 
to stronger reactions and counterstrategies from TNCs affecting their operational 
control of the industry (commodity shipments decrease and boycott, imposed 
compensation discounts oh Bolivian tin processed in Patirio's smelter, home 
governments pressure and higher than "book value" compensation formula 
in Guyana, etc.). In both cases prevailed political factors (of different 
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origin and nature, as underlined above) which conformed the host countries 
people unity against the TNCs presence in the country. 
c) In both countries the nationalization of TNCs assets represented only 
a first step in the long term realization of national sovereignty principle 
over natural resources through the development of an independent public 
sector. The short-term production and financial losses of the newly 
established public enterprises had been aggravated by the above enumerated 
TNCs counterstrategies, exodus of qualified personnel, management, marketing 
and labour problems, etc. In the 1970s, however, the public enterprises 
conformed in both countries an important factor of a long-term perspective of 
selfsustained social and economic development embodied in governments 
strategies and plans. The recognization of this new situation by industrialized 
countries and TNCs had been reflected, for example, in the Triangular Plan 
(1961-1971) with U.S., Federal Germany and Inter-American Development Bank 
co-operation in the consolidation of Bolivian tin industry. Similarly U.S. 
aluminium TNCs tried to fill the vacuum created in Guyana after the (nationalization) 
conflict with Canadian ALCAN. Perspectively, the concentrated negotiating 
capacity of the public sector allows for broader development of new types of 
linkages with TNCs. 
d) Finally, the public sector in Bolivian tin industry and Central American 
banana industry played an important role in technical and marketing assistance 
to national medium-and small-scale producers counterwailing thus their previous 
full dependence on TNCs. 
5. External market diversification and horizontal co-operation 
The market diversification in general and, long term alumina sales contracts 
of Jamaica with "non-traditional" buyers - Venezuela, Algeria, Hungary and 
Soviet Union, in particular, conformed an important bargaining capacity factor 
of the developing producer countries countervailing the resource diversification 
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strategy of TNCs. The long term sales contracts of Jamaica totalling yearly 
some 550,000 tons of alumina since 1984 are a base for the construction of a 
new alumina plant in South Manchester owned by the public enterprise Jamaica Bauxite 
Mining Limited and, with technical and financial co-operation of Hungary and for 
the expansion of its Merchant Wterine in co-operation with the Government of 
Norway. On the other hand, the short-term alumina sales agreeements with 
Venezuela, Hungary and Soviet Union depend on the TNCs willingness to increase 
production from their idle capacities and on the coming on stream of the joint 
ventures with ALCOA and ALCAN allowing for the Jamaican Government share 
in alumina shipments. This dependence conformes in short term, a stronger 
bargaining capacity of aluminium TNCs in their negotiation with the Government 
of the bauxite levy rebates, as mentioned above. 
An important factor of horizontal co-operation among the developing 
producer countries had been their associations IBA and UPEB which in spite of 
the lack of market power in production and prices regulation, helped to the 
unity of the developing countries governments in their policies and strategies 
vis-a-vis TNCs. 
Contrary to this positive experience had been the fate of several joint 
venture projects including Jamaica and other CARICOM countries, Mexico and 
Venezuela,for the development of bauxite and alumina industry and aiming at the 
joint use of bauxite resources, cheap energy and industrial skill of developing 
countries with large consumer market. 
In the middle of 1979 none of these joint venture projects was on stream. 
The reasons of these problems and delays in the important field of horizontal 
co-operation in joint investment and production development require more detailed 
analysis. 
Among most important factors emerging from the negative experience of the 
Jamaica-Mexico joint venture seem to be the problems of developing countries in 
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financing their shares of the venture. In this context the role of international 
and regional finance organization like the United Nations World Bank and 
Interamerican Development Bank with its project of risk-security fund for 
TNCs investing in Latin American's natural resources, seems to be of highest 
priority. 
X X X 
Future projects alternatives of Joint CEPAL/CTC Unit in the Interregional Project 
on TNCs in Primary Commodities 
a) Before the New York Interregional Seminar in 1980 
Profundization and further analytic elaboration of the three cases in base 
of the results of the Bangkok Expert Meeting and particularly in: 
- Public enterprise investment and rrerketing linkages with TNCs in the 
tin industry, in terms of a long term development perspective of Bolivia; 
- Joint Ventures among developing countries in the bauxite industry: 
the experience of Caribbean countries and, particularly, Jamaica. 
1/ 
b) New commodity case studies — 
- TNCs in the copper industry in Peru and Chile; 
- TNCs in iron ore industry; 
as to agricultural products: 
- TNCs in the sugar cane industry and the coffee industry of Latin America. 
1/ Depending on the availability of additional budget resources. 
